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Women are less likely to participate less in the labor market, earn lower wages, and supply
more labor inside the household, especially when married. In this dissertation, I study the dynam-
ics of labor supply choices, which involves the time allocation decisions within households, by
developing a household search model of the labor market that includes home production. I esti-
mate the model with household-level data from Colombia that contain rich information on both
labor market outcomes and spouses’ time use.
The model allows for a gender gap decomposition that takes into account optimizing behav-
iors. This decomposition captures the differential impacts of wage offers, labor market frictions,
productivities in home production, and preferences over leisure and consumption in determining
the observed gender differentials in the labor market. I find that differences in home production
between spouses account for a substantial share of the gender participation gap in Colombia.
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The labor specialization between men and women is a well known empirical regularity. Men
are more likely to participate and supply more hours in the labor market while women are less
likely to participate and spend fewer hours in the labor market and dedicate more time to home
production. In this dissertation, I study the dynamics of labor supply choices, which involves the
time allocation decisions within households, by developing a household search model of the labor
market that includes home production. The paper focuses on spouses’ decisions as any existing
gender gap widens for married individuals.
To study the household as a risk-sharing institution where households pool individuals’ income
and decide upon spouses’ labor supply and home production allocations to smooth consumption
under labor market uncertainty, I use search models. One well-noted evidence of the risk-sharing
decision making is the so called added-worker effect, that consist of the empirical observation
where the wife increases labor supply after the husband loses his job (Lundberg (1985), Stephens
(2002), Cardona-Sosa et al. (2016)). An important characteristic of search models is their ability
to generate equilibrium unemployment and wage dispersion. As there are documented gender gaps
in the switching probabilities between labor market states (transitions), unemployment rates, and
wages, the search models are an increasingly popular and suitable tool to simultaneously explain
all the previous dimensions and their gender differences.1
However, labor gaps coexist with home production gender gaps. The two of them have a
direct relationship: for example, both husbands and wives with children allocate more time on
1In Colombia, males have the highest participation rate and that married women have the highest probability
to move from employment to unemployment (Lopez and Lasso (2016)), while being a married woman reduces the
participation probability, and having younger children reduces even more women’s probability of participation (Tenjo,
Alvarez, and Jimenez (2016)). Arango and Rios (2016) found that conditional on being unemployed, females have
a higher probability to remain unemployed, and that at higher husband’s income levels, the unemployment rate falls
because wives exit the labor market to become nonparticipants.
home production, but wives increase home production to a greater extent and stop participating
in the labor market. Husbands’ reaction to increases in household size not only adjusts the home
production and leisure time allocations but could also result in labor participation changes.2
In this dissertation, I develop and estimate a search model where I formally model the spouses’
leisure and home production decisions, which is essential in understanding the spouses’ benefits
and opportunity costs of labor participation.3 Each household maximizes intertemporal utility, with
both spouses choosing their time allocation to leisure, home production, and work. The household
optimal decision rules are based on reservation values over the possible joint labor statuses.4 The
model structure includes five mechanisms that capture several labor market realities, household
consumption, the home production function, leisure, and fertility evolution.
First, all labor market parameters are allowed to be gender-specific to account for the gender
asymmetries in the labor market structure.5 The wage offer distributions, job offers arrival rates,
termination rates, and search costs define the labor market parameters. Search costs are only paid
when unemployed. Husband and wife share the search costs as a dyad. The labor income of both
spouses equals the market consumption of goods.
Second, household consumption is defined as a combination of market consumption and home
production output. This consumption definition captures how labor supply and home production
interrelates and explains the spouses’ optimization process. This definition follows Gronau (1977)
2For the US, Flabbi and Mabli (2108) showed that husbands’ labor participation remains unaltered with or with
children. For the Roma population in six Balkan countries, Salazar-Saenz and Robayo-Abril (2020) showed that
husbands with children participate more in the labor market, increase the home production allocation, and reduce
leisure. In terms of changes of labor market choices, Colombia looks more than the US. Husband’s labor participation
remains unaltered. However, in the three cases wives reduce labor participation and increase the allocation in home
production.
3To better model gender gaps, previous papers had consider other non-pecuniary dimensions such as personality
traits gender differentials (Todd, Flinn, and Zhang (2020)), parental leave policies (Choi (2018) and Xiao (2020)), and
differences in social values (Gousse et al. (2018)). My paper contributes to this literature by using time usage surveys
to derive the value of non-pecuniary activities by spouses.
4Spouses make labor supply decisions both on the extensive (participate or not) and intensive (how many hours)
margins. In the empirical application, the intensive margin is constraint to part-time and full-time work hours, and
decisions over leisure and home production time are performed choosing from a continuous set of hours.
5The estimation optimization algorithm might find that the parameters are equal between genders. In other words,
the gender difference is not imposed. I restricted the data to low educated individuals, I can define homogenous labor
parameters for all husbands and wives.
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concept that market consumption and home production can perfectly substitute each other to pro-
duce consumption. However, my model allows for imperfect substitution to capture that even
when the market has substitutes for home production, such as out-home laundry or children tu-
toring, spouses could still perform positive home production amounts when buying such market
services.
Third, spouses generate home production by allocating time to it, and each spouse is allowed
to have specific home production productivity. The gender distributions over the home production
productivities types are estimated. All else equal (having children or not in my model), this defi-
nition of unobserved heterogeneity seeks to capture 1.) that conditional on belonging to the same
labor market state, not all individuals allocate the same amount of time between home production
and leisure.6, and 2.) individual differences in labor supply (e.g. conditional to the husband’s wage,
one wife decides to participate in the labor market and another wife does not participate). In the
model, each spouse can be either a high type or low type in home production, where the high type
is less likely to participate in the labor market and exert more time in home production.
Fourth, leisure taste parameters can also be gender-specific to capture gender asymmetries in
leisure consumption.
Fifth, parameters that weight the importance of home production output and each spouse’s
leisure into the instantaneous utility are allowed to vary depending on the presence or absence of
children. This model’s characteristic seeks to account for the spouses’ change in time allocation
and labor supply due to children’s presence. The model allows for the presence of children in the
household or not by defining an exogenous probability of having at least one child and an aging
children shock.7
6As I only have time allocation from the data, I cannot distinguish between productivity and one’s taste for home
production. In this dissertation, I will talk about home productivity, though the measure captures both taste and pro-
ductivity without being able to disentangle them. When considering sexual division of labor, Becker (1974, 1981)
proposed that spouses should specialize in market or non-market goods production depending on each spouse’s com-
parative advantage. However, Becker did not consider different comparative advantage levels within men or women
as a group. Then my modeling strategy adds within gender hetorogeity making the household types defined by the
productivities pair of each spouse.
7An aging children shock means that children come of age and leave the household.
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I estimate the model using two individual-level datasets from the Colombian labor force sur-
vey (GEIH) and the time usage survey (ENUT) for 2012-2013.8 Colombia though is a developing
country, has a well-developed labor market where husband and wives participate, and public policy
is aiming to close the gender gaps in the labor market (WEF (2019) and CEPAL (2019)). Addi-
tionally, Colombia has good available data in home production. I restrict the sample to spouses
whose educational attainment is high school level or lower.9
The data indicate that husbands participate more in the labor market, and they are the highest
earners, while wives participate less and earn lower wages.10 Also, husbands are more likely to
switch to full-time jobs than wives, achieving a higher proportion of full-time workers. Wives have
higher unemployment rates. Regarding the time use dimension, husbands and wives participate in
home production, but still, wives dedicate more time to home production: even when husbands
and wives share the same labor status, wives devote more time to home production.11
The estimated parameters show that males receive job offers more frequently, jobs terminate
less frequently, and receive higher wage offers; however, they have higher estimated values of
the search costs. In addition, wives are more willing than husbands to reduce leisure across the
different labor statuses. Concerning home production, there are more highly productive types
of wives than husbands, resulting in lower labor force participation of wives, on average, more
likely to devote relatively more time to home production. The estimation aligns with the data by
8GEIH (Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares - Colombian Labor Market Household Survey) si similar to the US
Current Population Survey and the ENUT (Encuesta Nacional del Uso del Tiempo - Time Usage National Survey) is
similar to the US ATUS. ENUT was conducted between 2012 and 2013.
9I choose only low-educated couples because they were the most frequent group among Colombian married in-
dividuals. Among the married individuals, couples where both members had low education levels were 69 percent,
couples where both members had high education levels were 13 percent, and couples where the education level were
different between spouses was 18 percent. If individuals with different education levels are included in the model, I
would need to estimate labor market parameters for diverse education levels and not only gender specific. Regard-
ing household decision making on time allocations, households can hire someone to provide childcare or domestic
services that substitutes spouses’ home production. However, low educated households, on average, do not have the
economic possibility to hire in the market external help, making low educated households decision making closer to
the behavior of my model (For a model that considers households decisions to hire external care see Berlinski et al.
(2020)).
10Vandenbroucke (2018) reported this empirical regularity for the US, and it is pretty common worldwide.
11In Colombia, male economic contribution to home production is one of the highest in LAC (OECD (2020)).
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predicting that wives perform more home production time, even when conditioning on the same
husband’s labor state.
I then decompose the participation and wages gaps by equating subsets of parameters. The
counterfactual experiments reveal that, when the wage distribution parameters are equated, wives’
participation increases the most while husbands’ is reduced slightly. Under those conditions,
household optimization reduces husbands’ salaries and compensates them with increased home
production time for husbands, higher wages for wives, and more labor supplied by wives.
Experiments that equate the gender proportions of low productivity types find that wives in-
crease labor supply. In these scenarios, wives augment labor participation because either wives, on
average, reduce their willingness to perform home production or husbands, on average, increase
their willingness to perform home production, reducing wives’ need to specialize in home produc-
tion. In those experiments, a shift in home production supply occurs: husbands increase it in both
cases. However, wives continue to allocate more time to home production.
The counterfactual scenarios indicate that husbands and wives change the time supplied in
home production to adjust for participation rates and wages changes. The above results on how
home production time responds to different scenarios highlights that the role of home production
in household optimization is not trivial and should be taken into account when measuring the
effectiveness of policies that seek to alter spouses’ incentives to participate in the labor market in
an effort to close gender gaps.
Finally, I implement a informative counterfactual experiment that introduces a Covid-19 type
shock as exogenous changes to some parameters of the model. This experiment shows that even
a proportional deterioration of the labor conditions by gender, produces the household’s solution
characterized by a large withdrawal of wives from the labor market. The purposed environment
mimics a labor market contraction, additional household’ needs for home production, and fewer
leisure activities to do. The decomposition of the proposed channels to capture a Covid-type
shock shows that most of the wives’ reduction of labor participation comes from the slowdown of
economic activity but the households’ needs for more home production also explains a significant
portion of the wives’ non-participation augment.
5
The literature using search models to study gender gaps on married individuals is growing.
Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2003), Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005), and Green-
wood et al. (2016) included home production in the decision set; however, women were the only
providers of home production and designated men as agents that were always supplying labor.
Another branch of the search literature has excluded home production from the decision space
but modeled spouses’ interactions as fully connected, interdependent, and spouses with the same
decision set. Within this literature, the first two household labor search models only considered
employment and non-employment labor market status ((Dey and Flinn (2008))[DF] and Guler,
Guvenen, and Violante (2012)[GGV]). However, these two models ignored how having children
affects labor decisions and other labor margins. Flabbi and Mabli (2018)[FM] expanded spouses’
labor market decisions to include both extensive and intensive margins as well as couples with and
without children. Each of the previous three models found that couples are risk averse in income.
A consequence of income risk aversion is that the reservation wage of one unemployed spouse
depends positively on the other spouse’s salary.12
I contribute to this literature by introducing the home production decision by both spouses.
One interesting finding is that the unemployed spouse’s reservation wages have an ambiguous re-
lationship with the employed spouse’s wage. I find that the reservation wage decreases or increases
with the employed spouse’s wages depending on the time commitment required for labor market
participation. This finding highlights the importance of accounting for spousal tradeoffs over time
allocation preferences. Interestingly, the model predicts that husbands have a positive reservation
wage for unemployed-unemployed couples while wives have a zero reservation wage.
Empirically, the equilibrium behavior implied by my model replicates the fact that married
males are the highest earners within the economy and that married females participate less in the
12One consequence of their finding is that omitting spouses’ interdependence when modeling men and women’s
labor market decisions can lead to biased estimations. Recent empirical evidence highlights the increasing proportion
of house-husbands and bread-winning wives within environments in which women’s labor participation is increasing
(in the USA, see: Golan and Kerdnunvong (2016), Kramer et al. (2015) and Kolpashnikova (2018)). This evidence
shows that considering males’ labor market independence might be a local equilibrium under particular conditions,
where the lack of opportunities in the labor market among females leads males to participate without regard to their
wives’ decisions or the family’s home production needs. As economic inclusion of women is increasing worldwide,
the conditions for men’s inelastic labor participation are changing.
6
labor market. If women participate, they work at lower wages since their reservation wage com-
ing out from unemployment is lower than husbands. Additionally, for unemployed-unemployed
couples, wives exit the market at lower husbands’ wage offers than husbands do when the wife
receives a job offer.
Another contribution to the previous literature is that, because of the model’s structure, I am
able to decompose the contributions to the observed gender gaps over participation, wages, and
home production time allocations into its mechanism: the structure of the labor market, the leisure
parameters, and the home production parameters.
My paper is also related to the growing literature using search models to study labor markets
in developing countries: this dissertation is one of the first attempts to estimate a household search
model for a developing country.13
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explains the model, chapter 3 describes
the data and Chapter 4 discusses identification of the model. Chapter 5 introduces the estimation
method, presents the estimates of the model’s parameters, and interprets the model’s fit with the
Colombian data. Chapter 6 describes the results of the gender gap decomposition and of the coun-
terfactual experiment simulating a Covid-type shock.Chapter 7 discusses limitations and proposes
future research. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the conclusions.
13Conti et al. (2018) are developing a household search model to study health insurance behavior in Brazil. For
labor search models in Latin America see Tejada and Navarro (2017), Albrecht, Robayo and Vroman (2017), Bobba
et al. (2017), and Bobba et al. (Forthcoming)
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CHAPTER 2
A HOUSEHOLD SEARCH MODEL OF THE LABOR MARKET WITH HOME
PRODUCTION
I develop a search model of the labor market that introduces home production to the joint deci-
sions of spouses over consumption and time allocations. Each spouse allocates time between work
in the market, work in home production, and leisure. Consumption is a common good composed
of goods bought in the market and produced at home.
2.1 Environment
The model is stationary and in continuous time. The household comprises two individuals, a
husband and wife, that behave as a single unit, maximizing a common utility function (unitary
model of the household).1 The model considers three labor supply states for the spouses: employ-
ment (E), unemployment (U), and nonparticipation (N), leading to 9 feasible labor supply states
per household.
A husband is denoted by index i and a wife by j. The households value the future at a discount
rate (ρ) and are composed of two infinitely-lived agents. Most labor market parameters are allowed
to be gender-specific: subscript A=M denotes the husbands’ parameters and subscript A=W the
wives’. Unemployed agents receive job offers at the Poisson rate λA and employed agents at the
rate γA. Jobs can be exogenously terminated at the rate ηA. Subscript K determines the presence
or absence of children in the household (denoted by k, nk, respectively). Fertility shocks to the
household occur at the Poisson rate τk and children leave the household at the Poisson rate τnk.
A wage (w) and an hour requirement (h) characterize a job offer. This pair (w, h) introduces
the intensive margin of labor supply in the model. Each job offer is drawn from an exogenous
distribution FA (w, h).
1Previous household unitary search models include: Dey and Flinn (2008), Guler, Guvenen, and Violante (2012),
and Flabbi and Mabli (2018), Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu, (2005), and Greenwood et al., (2016).
The instantaneous household utility is a function of 1) the joint consumption that a house-
hold produces (a combination of labor income and home production output, Zij), 2) the leisure
of each spouse (li, lj), and 3) each spouse’s search cost conditional on his or her unemployment
siI (Ui) , sjI (Uj).2 Flow utility is an increasing function of consumption and leisure and a decreas-
ing function of search costs. I allow the presence or absence of children (K) to have an impact on
the household’s flow utility parameters. Formally:
UK = uK
(




, siI (Ui) , sjI (Uj)
)
(2.1)
where each spouse’s total time per spouse is divided between leisure (la), hours worked (ha), and
home production time (hpa), Formally:
1 = la + ha + hpa, a = i, j (2.2)
And, as a consequence, leisure is equal to:
la = 1− ha − hpa, a = i, j (2.3)
Following Gronau (1977) consumption is understood as the sum of production activities inside a
household that could be substituted by goods and services in the market. Therefore, households
can not only buy market goods and services using labor income, but also produce goods at home
using time inputs.3
Equation 2.4 defines consumption at the household level. Equation 2.5 shows that labor income
is equal to spouses’ hourly rate times the working hours. Equation 2.6 illustrates that the output
of home production depends positively on each spouse’s hours spent in home production as well
2The indicator function I(Ua) is equal to one if the agent a is unemployed. I normalize the search cost of on-the-job
search equal to zero. An approach also followed by FM.
3Cleaning, repairing the dwelling, reading stories, or helping with the education of the children are activities that
could be done by someone hired in the market; for the couple, that extra time could be allocated toward leisure or
work in the market.
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as some parameters that measure how productive each spouse is with regard to home production
(πi, πj).4 In this dissertation, I will refer to those parameters as the productivity of each spouse in
home production. The dyad of spouses’ productivity levels defines the different household types.
This modeling strategy creates a direct link between spouses’ labor earnings and home production.
Specifically, labor earnings and home production can be positive or negative correlation. Addi-




Inc (wi, hi, wj,hj) , Z
(
hpi, hpj, πi, πj
))
(2.4)
Inc(wi, hi, w(j, )hj) = wihi + wjhj (2.5)
Z = Z(hpi, hpj, γi, γj) (2.6)
2.2 Value Functions
Each household values the contingent state as a function of the flow utility, the expected future
shocks, and the optimal behavior in reaction to those shocks. The notation for the value functions
and their components are presented in Table 2.1. The value function EE represents households
where both spouses are employed; EU and EN represent the value functions where one spouse
works, and the other is unemployed, or a nonparticipant; UU the situation where both spouses are
unemployed; UN the case where one spouse is unemployed and the other is nonparticipant; and
NN represents the value function where both spouses are nonparticipants.5
When facing a shock, each household type defines his decision rules by comparing the value
function of the labor status that they have available.
4Home production productivity was introduced by Becker (1974). However, in my model I allow these productiv-
ities to be spouse specific and not gender specific as Becker.
5To reduce the number of inputs for a value function, spouses’ leisure are not reported as inputs, because la =
1− ha − hpa.
10
As an example, equation 2.7 presents the value function where both spouses are employed
(the same case as the first row of Table 2.1). K represents the current household’s status with
respect to having children (with or without children). The first term shows that when both spouses
are employed, their flow utility is given by the combination of consumption and each spouse’s
leisure (li, lj) (where home production outcome Z has the spouses’ time and productivity as inputs
Z(hpi, hpj, πi, πj)); in the EE case, neither of the spouses pays the gender-specific search cost.
However, in the future, each spouse could receive a job offer (γM , γW ) at any of the available wages
offered defined with w′, and the hours requirements represented with h′. When the household
faces a new job offer, the spouses choose between four labor choices, the first of which is that
both spouses work at their present wages (rejecting the job offer). If the spouse with the offer
accepts it, then the other spouse’s three remaining choices are: keeps his/her current job, moves to
unemployment, or moves to nonparticipation. Each spouse also can lose his or her job exogenously
(ηM , ηW ), and the household could receive a fertility shock (τ¬K).6 If a fertility shock arrives, then
the available labor statuses’ valuations change when the fertility status changes to ¬K.7 Thus, for
each shock, the couple will choose the state of labor and time allocation that maximizes the value
6The max operator represents couples’ optimal behavior. This value function is defined in continuous time. Thus,
the probability of two shocks arriving at the same time is equal to zero and, therefore, no joint shock occurrence is
considered.
7That is, if the couple has children (K=k), the realization of τ¬K means that children come of age and leave the
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
The model’s value functions for different household labor status combinations imply the fol-
lowing tradeoffs between time use and labor supply, illustrating a tension between the instanta-
neous utility and the continuation values.8
Nonparticipants only generate instantaneous utility from leisure and home production; they do
not pay the search costs. As nonparticipants do not receive job offers, the labor continuation value
does not affect the nonparticipation value function. The unemployed also generate instantaneous
utility from leisure and home production, yet they reduce the flow utility as they must pay the
search cost. However, in contrast to nonparticipation, the labor continuation value impacts the
8In the value functions, the continuation value refers to the portion that calculates the expected future values at any
given shock.
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unemployment value because acceptable job offers might arrive probabilistically. Employment,
relative to unemployment, generates two sources of gain in the flow value: labor income (hourly
wages times hour work) and zero search cost. Employment also produces losses, such as less
time to allocate between leisure and home production, and continuation value reductions if the job
offers when employed arrive less often than when unemployed. Even when the employed spouse
has less time to allocate between leisure and home production, consumption must increase in the
wage region that determines acceptable job offers. The extent of consumption increases depends
directly on how the consumption function combines labor income and home production.
2.3 Equilibrium
A set of value functions (NN, NU, NE, UN, UU, UE, EN, EU, EE) and optimal time allocations
at each labor status describes the model’s equilibrium. The value functions numerically solve the
Present Discount Value (PDV) (as described in equation 7). The equilibrium optimal household
decisions on the labor market and time allocations are characterized by reservation value rules that
determine which option maximizes the PDV within the different decision-making scenarios that
spouses might encounter.
I model spouses’ behaviors using unitary models because cooperative models often have shown
multiple equilibria when calculating value functions. Because of the high dimension of the spouses’
decision set that I consider (wages, hours worked, leisure, and home production), the non-unique
equilibrium property of cooperative models could make estimation intractable.9 To numerically
solve the value functions, there are two options: closed form solution or fixed-point algorithms. I
implement fixed point algorithms because the solution of the PDV through closed-form solutions
are unfeasible given the size of the decision space.
The model’s equilibrium follows the behavior of the unitary models of DF, GGV, and FM.
In their papers, as in mine, spouses have symmetric decision sets. Empirically, they found that
the unemployed spouse’s reservation wage was an increasing function of the employed spouse’s
9For recent cooperative models involving marriage and taxation, see Gayle and Shepard (2019); for models involv-
ing marriage, labor supply, home production, and family values, see Gousse, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017). Coopera-
tive models also include the marriage market in their analysis; however, as the main focus of my research is on spousal
time use and labor supply decisions, estimating the marriage market is out of the scope of my research.
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wage.10 Also, their estimations showed that an employed, yet lower earning spouses married to an
unemployed person, could quit his-her job when the unemployed spouse receives a high enough
wage offer. GGV labeled this endogenous quitting behavior the breadwinner cycle. Even when
my model’s equilibrium shares most of DF, GGV, and FM properties, the inclusion of home pro-
duction within the model potentially changes some equilibrium predictions that will be discussed
in Chapter 5.
10In contrast, they stated that if households were risk neutral on income, each spouse would make labor market deci-
sions as if they were single, and completely independent from their spouse’s labor market decisions. In such a case, the
reservation wage of one spouse would be independent of the labor status or wage of their spouse. GGV demonstrated
mathematically that reservation wages of the unemployed spouse under income risk lover would decrease on the wage
of the employed spouse. None of these three papers found a non-increasing reservation wage.
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Table 2.1: Value Functions, Flow Utility, and Shocks
Value Function Flow Utility Shocks
1 EE
[






wihi + wjhj , Z(hpi, hpj)
)
, 1− hi−hpi, 1− hj−hpj , 0, 0
)
γM , ηM , γw, ηW , τK
2 EU
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)
γM , ηM , λw, τK
3 UE
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, 1−hpi, 1− hj−hpj , sM , 0
)
λM , γw, ηW , τK
4 EN
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)
γM , ηM , τK
5 NE
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, 1−hpi, 1− hj−hpj , 0, 0
)
γw, ηW , τK
6 UU
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λM , λw, τK
7 UN
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, 1−hpi, 1−hpj , 0, 0
)
τK
Note: Households are susceptible to receive a children shock (τK ) in any labor market state. The parameters sM , sW indicate that when
either agent is unemployed, that agent faces the gender-specific search cost to receive job offers. The unemployed spouse receives job offers at rates
λM , λW . A nonparticipant does not face the search cost, nor receive any job offers. When both spouses are nonparticipant, they receive flow utility




This research utilizes two datasets: the Colombian labor market household survey (GEIH)
and the Colombian time usage survey (ENUT) for 2012 and 2013. GEIH is used to compute
the Colombian labor market environment, and ENUT is used for the couples’ time allocations
depending on spouses’ labor market states.
3.1 GEIH - Household Labor Market Survey
GEIH is the survey that the Colombian government uses to evaluate the labor market and is the
official data source used to calculate the unemployment rate. I use the years of 2012-13 so as to
coincide with the first ENUT sample period. The final dataset had the following characteristics and
restrictions: only married couples living without any other adult, spouses aged 25-55, with children
aged 0-18 or without children, individuals with a high school education or lower within urban areas
are included.1 Additionally, I trimmed the top and bottom 2 percent of the wage distributions and
full-time employment is defined as 40 or more hours per week. The final sample size of the GEIH
is 72,408 individuals and the ENUT is 4,688 individuals (Table 3.1).
As Figure 3.1 shows, Colombian wives are less likely to participate in the labor market in ad-
dition to having higher proportions of unemployed. When children are present in the household,
wives participate 8 percentage points less, and husbands tend to participate 2 percentage points
1I choose only low-educated couples because they were the most frequent group among Colombian married indi-
viduals. Also, low educated households, on average, do not have the economic possibility to hire someone to provide
childcare or domestic services to substitute spouses’ home production. This characteristic makes low educated house-
holds decision making closer to the behavior of my model.
more, which increases the proportion of full-time workers by about 5 percentage points.2 Condi-
tional on being employed, the histogram of work hours in Figure 3.2 shows that there is a greater
mass of husbands working high hours than wives.
Table 3.1 presents joint husbands’ and wives’ labor market states to illustrate assortative mat-
ing.3 The data inside the borders include the percentage of households with spouses in the associ-
ated labor market states (joint probabilities), while the 5th column and row represent the percent-
ages of husbands and wives in each labor market state without conditioning on the spouse labor
market state (marginal probabilities). Table 3.1 shows that both spouses work full-time in 30 per-
cent of the sample, 36 percent of the households have husbands working full-time and wives in
nonparticipation, and less than 1 percent of the households have both spouses as nonparticipants.
Table 3.1 also shows that in terms of hourly wages, there are wage gender gaps both in part-time
and full-time jobs.
In the absence of panel data in Colombia, retrospective information summarizing past labor
market status is collected. In the GEIH household’s individuals are observed at a particular point
in time, and employed individuals at the time of the interview report wages and hours worked. The
survey also asks about the labor market state before the one reported at the interview time, but no
information about previous wages or hours work is collected. In light of this data limitation, I aug-
ment the model to include previous employment status for job switchers. Researchers have usually
built transitions between labor market states using the self-reported information about changes in
the labor market from cross-sectional surveys when working with Colombian data.4 I utilize the
same method in this dissertation.
2Unemployment is defined as the nonworker who had been looking for a job for the last 4 weeks before the time of
survey, while a nonparticipant is defined as a nonworker who is not unemployed. Between 2001 and 2003, for a sample
of whites and all education levels in the US, wives with children increased nonparticipation by 15 percentage points
(FM). Colombia exhibits a lower wives participation change with respect when comparing wives’ nonparticipation
with and without children (about 8 percentage points).
3Assortative mating is the process by which people with similar characteristics choose a partner. In the present
study, we used that definition to present the proportion of couples married on each of the cells defined by both spouses’
labor market. From table 3.1, besides FF, Colombia doesn’t present a positive assortative mating in the labor market.
4For Colombia, see Arango and Rios (2016), Lasso et al. (2016), and Albrecht, Robayo and Vroman (2017) for
previous work constructing transitions from self-reported information.
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3.2 ENUT - Time Usage Survey
An advantage of using structural models is the ability to use information that is not confined to
a single dataset. For Colombia, the first-time usage survey was collected between 2012-2013 and
is called the ENUT and recorded the activities that a person performed during the previous day. It
has questions such as time devoted to work, sleeping, taking care of children, transportation time,
and other possible answers. ENUT represents the same population as GEIH. Table 3 shows that
the labor market proportions of this dissertation’s estimation sample are equivalent between ENUT
and GEIH.
In ENUT, to avoid inflation of leisure and home production time from workers resting on the
weekends, I only retain surveys conducted during business days: Mondays to Fridays. All reported
activities are classified between leisure, home production, and working, and for every individual,
the time reported is normalized and sums up to one.5
The bottom panel of Table 3.1 shows that, at all labor market states, wives dedicate more time
to home production. Table 3.2 shows the mean spouses’ time allocation conditional on the joint
spouses’ labor market status. It shows that even when husbands and wives have the same labor
market status, wives allocate more time in home production than husbands.
Table 3.2 also reveals that each spouse’s home production allocation depends positively on the
other spouse’s labor status. Specifically, for wives with children, the home production allocation
increases when the husband goes from nonparticipation to being employed.
For households, raising children demands additional economical resources and home produc-
tion from the household. The presented evidence shows that Colombian couples increase the home
production supply through husbands’ and wives’ time, but wives increase the most the home pro-
duction supply and reduce labor market participation.
5The ENUT total time report does not necessarily sum up to 24 hours. This is a normal characteristic of time usage
surveys.
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Figure 3.1: Observed Extensive Margin of Labor Supply
Note: Data are from the 2012-2013 Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH). Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed
part-time; F= employed full-time; E= Employed
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Figure 3.2: Observed Intensive Margin of Labor Supply
Note: Data are from the 2012-2013 Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH).
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: Labor Market and Time Use Components
Labor Market Status:
GEIH ENUT
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
No Children Children No Children Children No Children Children No Children Children
N 3.8 1.9 33.7 41.5 N 4.4 2.8 40.8 52.7
U 5.0 3.8 6.4 4.2 U 3.2 3.2 4.4 3.6
P 6.7 5.0 19.5 21.6 P 13.5 11.7 15.8 15.8
F 84.6 89.2 41.8 32.7 F 78.9 82.2 39.0 27.9
Total 4977 31227 4977 31227 Total 341 2003 341 2003
Labor marker assortative mating:
Wives’ labor state
N U P F All Husbands:
Husb. N 0.9 0.1 0.4 0.8 2.2
labor U 1.3 0.3 0.8 1.6 4.0
State P 2.0 0.2 1.4 1.6 5.2
F 36.2 3.7 18.6 30.0 88.6
All Wives: 40.4 4.3 21.3 34.0 100.0
Labor market transitions from a year to the present:
Husbands Wives
From\To N U P F From\To N U P F
N 1.2 - - - N 31.89 - - -
U 0.1 0.1 1.1 15.8 U 1.26 0.39 7.73 11.05
P - - 2.5 - P - - 9.67 -
F - - - 44.9 F - - - 14.65
EMP 0.8 3.9 1.6 27.9 EMP 7.28 3.91 3.88 8.29
Wages (thousands of pesos):
Mean Std Dev
Overall By Spouse Labor Market State Overall By Spouse Labor Market State
N U P F N U P F
P Husbands 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.4 1.1 1.9 1.9
F Husbands 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 0.6 1.6 1.6
P Wives 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.2 . 2.1 2.2 2.2
F Wives 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.9 0.6 1.8 1.8 1.7
Percentage of time dedicated to home production:
Mean Std Dev
Lab. Mar. Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Status: No Children Children No Children Children No Children Children No Children Children
N 21.5 20.8 30.2 39.5 11.2 15.7 17.9 16.0
U 27.6 22.6 29.9 39.4 10.9 15.5 16.9 15.0
P 12.7 15.7 21.4 30.8 9.2 14.1 7.1 12.3
F 7.4 9.3 12.7 19.3 6.8 11.3 6.6 8.6
Note: Data are from the 2012-2013 Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH) and Encuesta Nacional del Uso del Tiempo (ENUT).
Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed full-time; EMP= Past Employment. From the
self-reported changes in the labor market, I built males’ and females’ transitions. All the matrices in of the labor market assortative mating and
labor transitions sum up to 100. In the survey, the tenure time of the current job is reported and if the change from a different job or
no-employment. Consequently, only changes from previous employment can be identified (no part-time or full-time), and as the model assumes
that the current worker coming from no-employment, found the job from unemployment, we only have transitions from unemployment to work.
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Table 3.2: Spouses’ Home Production Allocation by Joint Labor Status
Percentage of time devoted to home production by
Husbands Wives
Without Children
wives’ labor state: wives’ labor state:
N U E N U E
Husbands’ N 18 N 12
labor U 22 U 18
State E 7 11 9 E 30 29 15
With Children
wives’ labor state: wives’ labor state:
N U E N U E
Husbands’ N 21 22 N 37 14
labor U 23 14 23 U 31 52 20
State E 9 13 11 E 40 39 24
Note: Data are from the 2012-2013 Encuesta Nacional del Uso del Tiempo (ENUT). Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; E=




The identification is organized by presenting the functional forms that I use in estimation, the
groups of parameters to be estimated, and, finally, the moment’ conditions used to identify these
parameters. I specify eight functional forms. First, the instantaneous utility function is a weighted
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) on consumption and each spouse’s leisure, and has two
linear search costs. I chose that functional form to keep comparability with the previous literature.
Flabbi and Mabli (2018) showed that all the flow utility parameters are identified from the spouses’
joint labor market decision.1 In the current version of the model, the search costs are gender-
specific parameters (sA). Individuals who do not participate in the labor market do not have any
search costs but do not receive job offers.
u (cij, li, lj, si, sj, Z; β
′, α′) =
(
1− αKM − αKW











−sMI (Ui)− swI (Uj)
The second functional form assumes a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) relationship be-
tween the consumption of market goods and home production output. I also assume that con-
sumption of market goods is equal to labor income. Additionally, I define a children-specific
parameter that scales home production to be comparable with labor income (the price of home
production: PKZ ). Both of these functional forms allow children to affect the flow utility directly




and for home pro-
duction (PKZ ). Those decisions are made because Colombian couples exhibit a differential labor
1Flabbi and Mabli (2018), included the following parameters: β′ = {δ, β1, β2};α′ = {αKM , αKW }
market and time usage behavior with or without children.
cij =
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Home production is also modeled with a CES function. By specifying either a Cobb-Douglas or a
linear function, it can adjust for different spouses degree of substitution on home production time
allocations.2 This flexibility may help the model fit better the data. The fourth functional form
assumption is that there are two spousal home productivity levels: high and low. This flexibility
captures gender differences in participation rates, in home production, and within gender labor
supply differences (i.e., conditional on the same husband’s wage, one wife participates in the labor
market and another does not participate).3 Equation 10 presents the CES home production function
that is achieved with spouses’ home time (hpa) and spouses’ productivity (πi, πj = {πL, πH}) as
inputs. Low type productivity is fixed and equal to one. More specifically, the home production
function is:







When only one spouse has high productivity, his working time will reduce household utility com-
pared to the situation where the other spouse is in the market. Then, due to the gender differentials
in labor participation and time allocations, a gendered probability per type can be defined as ΠA,
which denotes the gendered probabilities of having low productivity at home.4
2Previous definition of home production functions with spouses time allocation as inputs included: Gayle and
Shepard (2016) used a Cobb-Douglas, Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) and Knowles (2013) used a CES. Choi (2018) also
used a composition between a CES and a Cobb Douglas in her paper; however, the CES part explained the time that
spouses were performing house work, while the Cobb-Douglas involved the CES output and the economic resources
that any additional children demand.
3Hereafter productivity is capturing the productivity/requirements/social norms/utility of time spent on chores.
Becker (1974) defined two sectors: market and non-market. Inside the families, the individuals with more relative
productivity between nonmarket and market production should devote more time to the nonmarket sector (household
production). Since females specialize more in the non-market sector, they are more productive in household produc-
tion.
4P (πi = π
L) = ΠM ;P (πj = π
L) = ΠW
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Even when the theoretical model was presented over continuous work hours and wages, the
computational solution and estimation of the model requires discretizations over work hours and
wages. The fifth functional form assumption comes from simplifying the work hours to part-time
or full-time, where full-time is a working schedule of at least 40 hours per week. The discretization
over work hours still captures gender’s specialization because wives accept more part-time jobs
than husbands. In the model, part or full-time hours are calculated as the average time for each
partition of work hours of more or less than 40.5
The sixth functional form assumption differentiates part-time from a full-time offer by defining
the probability of receiving a part-time job offer, for which the notation is p. The seventh func-
tional assumption is a discretization of the wage range by a 50 point grid and a maximum wage
value of 8 thousand pesos. The eighth functional form assumed is a Log-normal wage offer dis-


















, w > 0 (4.4)
Thus, with these functional assumptions, the model has to identify 35 parameters, represented by
the following set (Ψ):
Ψ = {λA, γA, ηPTA , ηFTA , µhA , σhA, p, αKM , αKW , PKZ , αNKM , αNKW , PNKZ δ, β1, β2, β3, sA,ΠA, πH , θ, ω, τK}
To identify the model, the first spouses’ set of moments is extracted from GEIH, where h and w
denote husband and wife, respectively, in household hh. The variables w, h, lab, labt−1, tlab, K and
tK are, respectively, wages, hours worked (to identify part-time or full-time), labor status, labor
status one year ago, the presence of children, and age of the younger children.6 SGEIH represents
5For the reminder of the dissertation the work hours are equal to either part-time or full-time (h = {P, F}) The
mean time share from Part-time= 0.218; full-time= 0.404 of a total daily time endowment per individual equal to one.
6With this information we can identify if a newborn has arrived during the last year.
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The second spouses’ set of moments is extracted from ENUT, h, hp, lab, and K are, respectively,
work time, home production time, labor status, and presence of children. SENUT represents the
















I split the identification discussion by partitioning the set of parameters into different subgroups
and explaining the moment conditions used to identify each parameters’ subgroup.
Regarding labor frictions and wage offer parameters, Flinn and Heckman (1982) showed that
to decompose the hazard rate from unemployment to employment between the arrival rate of job
offers and the distribution over the accepted wages, a recoverable wage offer distribution function
must be assumed, and the discount rate should be fixed. I assume a fixed discount rate of five
percent per year.7 For this reason, I assumed the recoverable Log-normal wage distribution con-
ditional on gender. Identification of primitive parameters µhA, σ
h
A, and λA comes from means and
variances of observed wages for each work schedule, from unemployment to employment transi-
tions (see Table 5.4, panels 3 and 5 on the left).8 Meanwhile, γA is identified from employment
to employment transitions. Identifying the probability of receiving part-time offers relies on ac-
cepted part-time and full-time proportions (see Table 3.1). ηhA is identified by the job termination
transitions.
To identify sA, I primarily use the nonparticipation and unemployment proportions. Setting sA
to zero will place all husbands and wives inside the labor market. Setting sA to a high value will
7Even though there is no consensus about the discount rate value, Flabbi and Mabli (2018) used it and it is in
between other values used in the household search models’ literature. Choi (2018) used 4 percent and Dey and Flinn
(2008) used 8 percent.
8For this exercise the reference period is one month
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place all husbands and wives in nonparticipation. Then, a value in between will make a fraction
of husbands and wives to be nonparticipants. To identify children transition parameters, I use the
law of motion restriction: τK = τNK nKnNK , where τK is the arrival rate of young children, τNK is
the aging children shock, and nK is the proportion of households with children.9 τK is identified
from the share of the households with a newborn and the steady-state proportions of households
with and without children.




and the two on home
production price (PKZ ) rely upon comparing households with and without children. In households
with children, wives increase the home production supply more than husbands, and wives have
lower labor participation (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1).
The identification of the flow utility’s risk aversion parameters relies on FM who demonstrated
identification from the interdependence of labor market spouses’ decisions. With the introduction
of home production time and as the work hours are fixed, the observed degree of reduction in home
production and leisure that spouses exhibit across different labor market states identifies the leisure
curvature parameters. The bottom panel of Table 3.1 shows that home production time allocation
of husbands without children can go from almost 21 percent when nonparticipating to 7 percent
when fully employed. The intuition is as follows: if the household is risk-averse in males’ leisure,
the parameter β1 will tend to zero. Then, males will demand almost the same leisure at any labor
market state. On the contrary, if the curvature parameter tends to 1, males will significantly reduce
leisure consumption when changing the state’s labor market. The identification of the consumption
curvature, δ, is not as straightforward as the previous parameters. I keep it to compare my estimates
with that of GGV, DF, and FM.
Regarding the imperfect substitution between market consumption and home production, con-
sider an unemployed-unemployed couple that is receiving a job offer for one spouse. If the couple
9Note that nK = 1− nNK .
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accepts the job offer and if ω tends toward one, both spouses will dramatically reduce the time al-
location in home production relative to the time allocation where both spouses were unemployed-
unemployed. This responses happens because the two inputs of the consumption function are
perfect substitutes. But, if the couple accepts the job offer and if ω tends toward 0, both spouses
will smoothly reduce or even could increase the time allocation in home production relative to the
time allocation where both spouses were unemployed-unemployed. This responses happens be-
cause the two inputs of the consumption function are far from perfect substitutes and consumption
is produced by combining market consumption and home production.
The identification of θ comes from the correlation of spousal home production at the 16 labor
market states: if θ tends toward one, then the home production function will tend to be linear, and,
at all labor market states, the spousal correlation of home production will tend toward zero. If θ
tends toward zero, then both spouses will need to allocate similar times in home production disre-
garding the joint labor market status. Thus, the similarity of spouses’ home production allocations
in the data will identity θ.
There are two data characteristics that break the identification between θ and ω: a positive or
non-decreasing relationship between one spouse’s labor supply and the other spouse’s home pro-
duction, and labor participation. Figure 4.1 shows that the positive relationship between full-time
husbands’ home production allocations and more wives’ work hours, begins from about ω equal
0.5 to zero. The closer ω to zero, the higher increase in husbands’ home production allocation. In
fact, the data show that the home production supply of one spouse slightly increases or is not re-
duced when the other spouse increments the hours worked, meaning that the substitution between
home production and labor income is not so acute.10
To prove that the first characteristic breaks identification between θ and ω, Figure 4.2 shows
that different θ values does not change the positive slope of the husbands’ time allocation and
10See bottom panel of table 5.4. Wives’ labor market state is fixed by choosing one column, and moving down in
the rows, changes husbands labor status. Husbands’ labor market state is fixed by choosing one row, and moving right
in the columns, changes husbands labor status. It can be seen that in most cases, once one spouse labor market is fixed,




To prove that the second characteristic breaks identification between θ and ω, Table 4.1 shows
that when θ tends toward zero labor participation reduces dramatically for both genders and la-
bor participation goes to zero for wives. There a is a positive relationship between the value of θ
and wives’ participation.11 These experiments show that some degree of substitution in the home
production function is necessary for households to exert labor supply and prove the importance to
introduce the spouses home production decisions to analyze joint labor market decisions. Interest-
ingly, table 4.1 also proves that labor participation varies with ω but, first, there is not a monotone
relationship and, second, labor participation does not move as much with ω than with θ.
Finally, the identification for πH ,ΠM ,ΠW comes from the mean and standard deviation of
home production for each gender at each joint labor market state, the participation decisions of
individuals married with spouses with similar characteristics (i.e., one participates, the other does
not participate and both are married with husbands earning the same wage), and the gender labor
participation differences. Without any heterogeneity, every couple in the same labor market and
children status would make the same home production and labor supply decisions.
11Table 4.2 shows husbands and wives home production time allocations at the joint labor market states. It confirms
that as θ tends toward one, at the same labor market state, Husbands and wives allocate more dissimilar time allocations
in home production. It also shows that the positive relationship between one spouse labor status and the other spouse
labor supply reduces with the value of ω. Fixing one column, fixes wives’ labor status, and moving down the rows











































































































































































































































































































Table 4.2: Spouses’ Home Production Allocation by Joint Labor Status: Sensitivity to Imperfect
Substitution Parameters (ω and θ)
omega=0.1 omega=0.25 omega=0.5 omega=0.75 omega=0.9
Husbands:
N U P F N U P F N U P F N U P F N U P F
N 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
U 0 0 32 36 0 22 26 28 21 0 24 23 27 0 20 17 32 0 18 12
P 0 0 24 26 13 0 17 19 10 0 13 13 9 0 7 5 9 0 3 2
F 13 13 15 18 8 10 11 12 5 7 7 7 3 5 3 2 3 3 1 1
Wives:
N 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
U 0 0 34 26 0 41 27 20 55 0 23 14 62 0 20 11 66 0 19 10
P 0 0 38 28 43 0 29 20 38 0 22 14 35 0 14 7 35 0 9 3
F 55 51 40 30 43 40 31 22 37 34 21 14 30 27 12 6 24 22 8 3
theta=0.1 theta=0.25 theta=0.5 theta=0.75 theta=0.9
Husbands:
N U P F N U P F N U P F N U P F N U P F
N 82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
U 0 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 26 0 0 30 14 0 25 27 0 15 22 25
P 0 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 18 0 19 20 10 0 15 16 6 0 12 14
F 42 0 0 0 25 0 22 22 12 13 14 14 5 7 8 10 2 4 5 7
Wives:
N 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
U 0 0 0 0 64 0 0 0 56 0 0 19 52 0 24 15 0 40 23 15
P 0 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 45 0 28 20 40 0 25 17 40 0 25 16
F 76 0 0 0 59 0 33 25 45 38 27 20 41 38 27 18 41 39 28 19
Note: Table reports husbands’ and wives’ home production time allocation by joint labor market status. Data is only reported for joint labor market
status with frequencies higher than 1% at different levels of ω and θ. Simulations based on parameter estimates (see Table 5.1). Abbreviations: N=
nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed full-time.
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Figure 4.1: Home Production Time Allocation of Full-Time Husbands with Respect To Wives’
Labor State: Sensitivity to Imperfect Substitution Between Market Consumption and Home Pro-
duction (ω)
Note: Figure reports home production time allocation of full-time husbands with respect to wives’ labor state. Simulations based on parameter
estimates (see Table 5.1). Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed full-time.
Figure 4.2: Home Production Time Allocation of Full-Time Husbands with Respect To Wives’
Labor State: Sensitivity to the Imperfect Substitution Between Spouses’ Home Production Time
(θ)
Note: Figure reports home production time allocation of full-time husbands with respect to wives’ labor state. Simulations based on parameter
estimates (see Table 5.1). Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed full-time.
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CHAPTER 5
MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTS AND MODEL FIT
5.1 Estimation Method




(QR (Ψ)− qs)′W−1B (QR (Ψ)− qs) (5.1)
Where qs are the chosen sample moments described in Equations 4.5 and 4.6, in total, I have
262 GEIH moments and 168 moments from the ENUT to identify 35 parameters. QR (Ψ) are the
simulated moments from a simulated sample size R, computed from the parameter vector Ψ. I set
R equal to 15,000. W−1B is the bootstrap weighting matrix and the diagonal is the inverse of the
bootstrapped standard errors and zeros elsewhere. B is equal to 10.000.
5.2 Results
This section describes the estimated parameters’ values presented in Table 5.1. The curvature
parameter of the CRRA terms show that Colombian households are more risk-averse in terms
of husbands’ leisure. Husbands’ leisure curvature parameter is closer to zero than wives. This
hierarchy means that males are less willing to change their leisure time when transitioning between
labor market states than females. Meanwhile, regarding the weights of leisure parameters, when the
household is without children, the husbands’ parameter is smaller than the wives’ parameter. But,
when the couple has children, the husbands’ parameter value increases and the wives’ parameter
decreases to a point where the husbands’ leisure weights more heavily than the wives’. The price
of home production also increases from the status without children to the status with children. All
those parameter movements should provide the model the flexibility to adjust to spousal changes
in labor supply and time allocation with and without children.
High household productivity types are 2.07 more productive than low productivity types. The
home production CES parameter, θ, is equal to 0.69; this means that Colombian spouses’ home
production time presents higher substitution than in a Cobb-Douglas (θ=0), but they are far from
being a linear production function (θ=1). Additionally, the consumption CES parameter, ω, is
equal to 0.34; this indicates that consumption is generated with a lower substitutivity than spouses’
home production time. The low-type home productivity proportions show that husbands are less
productive in home production (0.92 vs. 0.52 for husbands and wives, respectively); this differ-
ence will fuel the decision-making process of time allocations between home production and labor
market, making males more prone to search in the labor market and less productive inside the
household.1 These gender type proportions imply that at the household level, the majority of hus-
bands are distributed in the following way: 48 percent are low-low, 44 percent are low-high, 4
percent are high-low, and 4 percent are high-high. The estimated parameters also exhibit higher
search costs for husbands than for wives.
As the unit of time in the model is months, Table 5.2 shows the relevant implied values for the
estimated wage offer distributions and the implied durations (in months) consistent with Poisson
arrival shocks in table 5.2 I found that unemployed males receive job offers slightly more frequently
than unemployed women (2.0 vs. 2.4 months, respectively), and employed males also obtain more
frequent on-the-job offers (33.5 vs. 37.4 months, respectively). Males have a less frequent layoff
shocks when working in part-time employment than females (39.2 vs. 40.8 months, respectively),
and full-time jobs (38.5 vs. 34.9 months, respectively).
The estimated arrival rates of the labor market as well as differences in the estimated parameters
of the wage offer distribution parameters show that husbands have an advantage in the labor market.
Husbands receive job offers more often, with higher wage levels, and once they accept a job offer,
the layoff shock will occur less frequently. Additionally, the model predicts that about 27 percent
of the overall job offers for wives and 2 percent for husbands are part-time offers.
1Remember that the measure used within the model cannot distinguish between productivity or taste for home
production.
2For example, λM means that unemployed males receive 0.46 job offers in a month or that unemployed husbands
receive a job offer every 2.2 months in expectation.
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5.3 Model Fit
The fit of the model is analyzed in terms of labor market proportions, the mean and standard
deviation of time use in home production, and mean wages. Figure 5.1 shows that the model suc-
cessfully fits males’ and females’ labor market proportions. Additionally, the model also captures
how wives with children reduce their labor market involvement and that husbands do not signifi-
cantly alter labor market proportions. Table 5.3 also shows that the model does a remarkable job
in fitting assortative mating and a decent job in fitting the labor market transition.3
Figure 5.2 shows that the model captures the home production time spent by wives and hus-
bands observed in the data; the model captures that both spouses increase their home production
time when having children. Therefore, the model captures labor supply and time allocations si-
multaneously; this fit was possible through the flow utility parameters and their change for couples
with children. The model shifts the value of the home production upwards to induce a rise in non-
participation and the household need for more home production when bearing children. However,
the model simultaneously increases the husbands’ weight of leisure and reduces the wives’ weight
of leisure. This movement happens because the rise in home production time supply is higher for
wives than for husbands.
In terms of home production, table 5.4 presents the observed and simulated mean spouses’ time
allocation conditional on the joint spouses’ labor market status. Even in this multidimensional time
use, the model fits the data trends.4
The standard deviation of time use in home production across labor states are also presented in
3Most of the hierarchies of the data transitions were respected by the estimated model. As an example, for the
husband’s transition, in the data 45 percent were full time workers one year ago and remained as full-time workers
at the time of the survey; the simulation estimated the proportion to be 50 percent. Meanwhile, for the husbands that
were employed one year ago and found a full-time job, the data had 28 percent; in this case, the simulation estimated
19 percent. Thus, the data hierarchies are respected, but there are some mismatches in the transition magnitudes. That
said, the model does a better job estimating the magnitudes of the wives’ transitions.
4A crucial point my identification strategy relies on the definition of a household’s consumption. Most of the
previous dynamic models defined the flow utilities to be additive and separable between labor income, each spouse’s
leisure, and household home production (Gayle and Shepard (2016); Choi (2018)). Salazar-Saenz and Robayo-Abril
(2020) also ended up using additive and separable flow utility because data availability. They only had time use
information for one spouse per household. As a result, in their model, nonparticipants allocate significantly more
home production than the data.
34
table 5.3; this data variation was exploited in the identification strategy to identify the unobserved
heterogeneity. Even when the model replicates some part of the data variability, there is still room
to improve the model’s fit by adding more heterogeneous agents. For computational tractability,
this is not implemented in the current version. Finally, the simulated overall wages fit the data
closely over the unconditional moments (see Table 5.3 and Figure 5.3); however, the model predicts
significantly higher wages for the working spouses married with a nonparticipant than does the
data.
5.4 Optimal decision rules
To understand how the model predicts spouses’ behaviors in the labor market, I present some
optimal decision rules at equilibrium through simulations at the estimated parameters. This section
presents the model’s maximization behavior using an example of the behavior of a household
with children and low home productivity for both spouses. The first decision rule shows how the
household would decide in terms of participation and job acceptances when sequential job offers
arrive for husbands and wives. Both spouses start nonworking.5 The second decision rule shows
how home production heterogeneity determines household labor decisions. The first and second
rules presented full-time job offers. The third decision rule illustrates how different household
types’ search strategies vary when facing job offers with part-time job offers.6
Starting with two nonworking spouses, the first decision the household has to make is par-
ticipation. In figures 5.4 and 5.5, the histogram on the left reports the four possible household
participation status values. In this case, both spouses decide to participate in the labor market as
that is status with the highest PDV. Then the second decision they face is accepting a job offer.7
The middle panel of Figure 5.4 represents the optimal decisions where the husband receives
the job offer first, and the same panel of Figure 5.5 illustrates the optimal decisions where the wife
5As the model is stationary, households through their lifetime can transit to any labor status if it is optimal according
to their decision rules. However, the aggregate households’ steady state respects the laws of motion between labor and
having children statuses embodied by the structural parameters and the model’s structure.
6The intensive margin of labor supply in the model is introduced by the work hours. In the empirical specifica-
tion, job offers with high or low intensive margin of the labor supply are denoted by F (full-time) and P (part-time),
respectively. Full-time job offers for both spouses are of forty or more hours per week.
7Panels 1 of Figures 1 and 2 represent the same decision for the same household.
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receives the job offer first. For the husbands’ wage offers in Figure 5.4, the middle panel shows
that the husband remains unemployed by rejecting low wage offers and takes jobs with high wages
offers. If the husband’s wage offer is not high enough, the wife remains unemployed; however, the
wife becomes a nonparticipant if the offer is high enough. By comparing the second panels of both
figures, the model finds that husbands have a reservation wage higher than zero while wives accept
jobs at any wage offer. 8 Additionally, the model predicts that wives are more prone to switch to
nonparticipation once the husbands receive a job offer. The husbands’ wage offers that make the
wives become a nonparticipant are above 3 thousand pesos, but the wife’s wage offers that make
the husband nonparticipant are above almost 8 thousand pesos. These two panels demonstrate that
the spouses’ labor supply decisions are different depending on which spouse receives a wage offer
first.
Once the husband (Figure 5.4) or the wife (Figure 5.5) has received an acceptable offer and
the other spouse decides to remain unemployed, the household faces a third decision: whether the
unemployed spouse that is still searching should accept a job offer or not. In this situation, it is
convenient to define the following sets of optimal labor decisions when he-she receives job offers.
Let us consider the case when the unemployed wife married to an employed husband receives a job
offer; the sets are defined over the wife’s wage offers conditioned on the husband being employed.
When facing a new job offer, there are four labor options for the couple: 1) rejecting the
job offer for the unemployed wife set (ΓEU (wj, hj)), 2) both spouses become employed (set
ΓEE (wj, hj)), 3) the unemployed wife takes the job offer, and the husband switches to unem-
ployment (set ΓUE (wj, hj)), or 4) the unemployed wife takes the job offer the husband switches
to nonparticipation (set ΓNE (wj, hj)). Options 3 and 4 corresponds to the breadwinner cycle. The
decision rules are:
8Vandenbroucke (2018) has described that in the US married males are usually the highest earners within the
economy and that married females participate less in the labor market. He has also described how, if wives participate,
they work at lower wages. My model’s reservation wage rules demonstrate that the model can explain that empirical
regularity.
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The last panel of Figures 5.4 and 5.5 present graphically the optimal decisions between the
previous four sets based upon the reservation wages that delimit those sets. The last panel of
Figure 5.4 on the right shows the wife’s reservation wages (y-axis) as a function of the husband’s
wage (x-axis). Conditional on the husband’s wage, above the curve FF, the wife will accept any job
offer, and both spouses become breadwinners (only sets ΓEE (wi, hi) and ΓEU (wj, hj) are chosen
in this case). The last panel of Figure 5.5 presents the husband’s reservation wages conditional on
the wife’s wages (path where the wife receives a job offer first). The model finds that above the
curve FF, both spouses became breadwinners (set ΓEE (wj, hj)). The last panels of Figures 5.4
and 5.5 show that the unemployed reservation wage is a nonincreasing function of the employed
spouse’s wage. This mechanism is novel in the household economics literature.
To illustrate how heterogenous households behave in the labor market, Figure 5.6 and 5.7 show
how the spouses’ decisions are affected by different productivities in home production when the
employed wife is working with a high-hours requirement and the husband is searching. Recall
that productivity in home production is heterogeneous and assumes two values: high and low. The
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four panels of Figure 5.6 and 5.7 report the possible four household combinations over these two
values. Each of those households decides differently because of how they value their time use over
the available options.
Figure 5.6 concentrates on job offers for the unemployed husband that require high work hours.
The length of the reservation wages over the x-axis shows up to what wife’s wage the husband
remains unemployed. The comparison of the four panels clearly shows how productivity in home
production affects participation decisions. For example, when the husband has low and the wife
has high home productivities, he is more willing to search in the market. In this case, the husband
remains unemployed until a wife’s wage of 7. The reservation wages over the x-axis are shorter
for the other household types because the husband goes to nonparticipation at lower wife’s wages.
Figure 5.6 also illustrates that the breadwinner cycle behavior depends upon the home produc-
tion types. When the husband has low and the wife has high home productivities, and if the wife
is in a low paid job, she switches to nonparticipation when the husband receives a high paying job
offer. However, if the husband’s job offer is not good enough, the wife quits her job and switches
to unemployment, so she keeps searching for better jobs. Meanwhile, for cases in which the wife
initially had a better paid job, she keeps her job, and the husband also accepts job offers above the
FF reservation wage. The wife only becomes a nonparticipant if the wife earns the lowest wage
and the husband receives a high paying job offer on the panels where the couple’s productivity
pairing is high-high (wage offer higher than 6, the household chooses the ΓEN (wj, hj) set). For
that household type, the spouses become dual earners if they receive a high enough wage offer at
any other husband’s wage offers.
Figure 5.7 concentrates on for job offers for the unemployed husband that require low work
hours. Relative to the situation presented in Figure 5.6, this situation shows less consumption at
the same wage level. Accepting a job offer also reduces the probability of receiving job offers with
higher hours, so the husband needs a high enough wage offer to accept it.9 Thus, the model finds the
usual positive slope of the husbands’ reservation wages as a function of the wife’s wages. There
9At estimated values, on-the-job searching is not as frequent as searching when unemployed.
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are few wage combinations across the different home productivity types where the breadwinner
cycle is optimal for the spouses.
Ultimately, the model’s equilibrium shows that the defined household types present different
spousal behavior either in the intensive and the extensive margins when facing the same deci-
sions. The unemployed reservation wage curves as a function of the employed spouse’s wages are
sometimes increasing or decreasing, depending on the job offers’ hours or the employed spouse’s
situation.
5.5 Empirical Implications of Equilibrium
In this section, I point out five relevant empirical implications associated with the model’s
equilibrium dynamics.
The first empirical implication of my model pertains to the reservation wages. In this regard,
my model has many features (shared with previous papers) that could increase or decrease one
spouse’s reservation wages.
Previous household search models (DF, GGV, and FM) have found that the reservation wage
increases with the employed spouses’ wage because the employed spouses’ wage funds the unem-
ployed spouse’s search for better job offers.
With the features that my model shares with the previous literature, the unemployed spouse’s
reservation wage decreases if the arrival rate for the unemployed or the mean of the wage offer
distribution has low values, i.e. the unemployed receive few job offers or receives them with lower
wages. Having on-the-job search decreases the reservation wage because the job conditions are not
permanent and accepting a job with a low wage could still derive in a high paying job in the future.
The higher the value or the more inelastic leisure is, the higher the reservation wage because the
worker needs to give up leisure and accepting a job should compensate the loss.
Nevertheless, explaining simultaneously that wives exhibit high nonparticipation rates and low
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labor earning has not been fully answered by previous household search models.10 The only pre-
vious search model that considers the participation decision is FM. They modeled individual het-
erogeneity as different search costs over the households. Individuals with high search costs tend
to remain out of the labor market. Obviously, the higher the search costs over the households, the
higher the nonparticipation rate.
In the FM model, the nonparticipation increases if the arrival rate for the unemployed or the
mean of the wage offer distribution has low values because participation has fewer returns making
the value of unemployment low relative to nonparticipation. Having on-the-job search decreases
nonparticipation because the job conditions are not permanent and participating in the market has
higher returns. The higher the value or the more inelastic leisure is, the higher the nonparticipation
rate because, eventually, a job offer will imply giving up the valuable leisure. Thus, in the FM
model, participating individuals have on average lower search costs, making them wait more time
for job offers with higher wages as the search activity is not too costly for them, and this prediction
is incompatible with wives earning lower wages. The previous mechanism took the employed
spouse’s wage to fund the search of the unemployed.
In addition to the previous channel, my mechanism includes a consumption function that com-
bines the employed spouse wage with the endogenous allocation of home production. The effect
of the employed spouse on the reservation wage through the consumption function is ambigu-
ous. It depends on how parameters’ values shape the production technology that combines home
production with labor income produced by work hours and time in the market.
With the estimated parameters, my model exhibit nonincreasing reservation wages for the un-
employed that receives a full-time offer while married an employed. This reservation wage’s shape
10Previous household search models predicted that married individuals should earn more than single individuals as
the reservation wage curve that they found depends positively of the employed spouse wage. On labor gender gaps
for the US, Vandenbroucke (2018) reported: 1) married males are the highest earners in the economy, among both
single and married males, 2) married females do not present a wage gap with single females, and 3) single and married
females participate less in the labor market. This empirical regularity also applies to Colombia.
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means that the higher the employed spouse’s wage, the less willing the couple is to wait for good-
enough job offers. The household prefers to take the labor income, combine it with the endoge-
nous home production allocations, and stop paying the search cost. The previous result is true even
when full-time jobs produce more labor income but reduce the time available to allocate on leisure
and home production. Section 3 showed that most of the accepted jobs in Colombia require high
working hours. A negative relationship in the reservation wages is a possibility that DF and FM
conceived but never really showed. GGV conceived that relationship if the couple were risk lover
in income, but their estimation found risk aversion. My models find this relationship due to the
inclusion of home production in the spouses’ decision making even though I still estimate income
risk aversion (see table 5.1).
Conversely, when the job offer has low work hours, then the household strategy exhibits an
increasing reservation wage. In this scenario, the job produces less labor income and gives up
the opportunity of getting a better job offer. Then my model’s reservation wages have different
slopes depending on the work hours requirements that job offers can potentially have because the
produced labor income and the endogenous home production generate different flow utility that
alters households’ patience to wait for job offers that would produce higher labor income, either
coming from more work hours or higher wages.
The second empirical implication has to do with the gender differentials that the household
optimization finds when reacting to similar situations. When the couple is in dual unemployment,
the household optimization finds different gender strategies to accept a job offer, making the wives’
reservation wage almost zero while husbands’ reservation wages are higher. Conditional on the
husband accepting a job offer, the model predicts that wives decide to exit the labor market at
lower husbands’ wages than the opposite situation (under the wage range where the wives accept
a job offer, the husbands only leave the market at top wives’ wage offers).
The third empirical implication of my model refers to the intriguing relationship among spouses’
home production time allocations, wages, and joint spouses’ labor supply. As most of the couples
have a full-time husband, I will focus the analysis of this section on those couples. When only the
husband is employed, figure 5 shows that the equilibrium relationship between wages and home
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production is negative, allowing both spouses to consume more leisure as spouses perceive more
labor income. However, the relationship is far more complex given the possible joint labor market
status.
The model predicts that the higher the wage of one spouse, the higher the probability of non-
participation of the nonworking spouse, and the higher the wage of one spouse, the lower time in
home production both spouses allocate. Therefore, employed-nonparticipant couples in average
should dedicate less time to home production than employed-unemployed couples.
This model’s prediction fits the data for husbands presented in table 5.4, full-time husbands
married with non-participating wives devote less time to home production than the ones married
an unemployed. For the wives’ home production allocation, the model also fits wives’ home pro-
duction allocations, but nonparticipant wives do not allocate less time in home production than
the unemployed. The explanation of this data trend is more complex, has to do with household’s
heterogeneity and selection into nonparticipation, and it will be explained later.
As explained in the identification section, there are many possibilities on how the home produc-
tion allocation of one spouse changes when the other spouse changes the labor status. The model
picks up that the home production time allocation increases when the other spouses increase the
work hours because the estimated substitution parameter is not close to that for perfect substitutes.
In terms of household behavior, this finding means that Colombian spouses respond to the other
spouse’s labor supply not only by changing reservations wages or labor supply, but adjusting as
well home production time allocations.
Another interesting finding relates to the substitution parameter of spouses’ home production
times. As table 4.1 shows, if the parameter is far from perfect substitution, both spouses allocate
similar home production times, and both spouses exit the labor market massively. Thus, for couples
to exert labor supply, home production combination technology needs to be such that it allows a
certain degree of substitution between spouses’ times, allowing the household to maximize utility
and consumption by adjusting time allocations and labor supply.
The fourth empirical implication pertains to household heterogeneity, time allocation, labor
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supply, and fertility. Previously, was presented the model prediction that couples’ home pro-
ductivity levels change the nonparticipation decision of wives married with husbands receiving
wage offers. But, how important are the home production productivities to explain labor supply?
Table 5.5 presents the equilibrium labor statuses and home production time allocations for the
different household types.11
Table 5.5 shows that gender participation differentials remain even in households where wives
have the same home production productivity level than the husbands, and even when the hus-
band has higher home production productivity. Between household types, wives’ nonparticipation
differentials could be as high as a 100 percent (compare nonparticipation rate of high-low with
high-high).
Table 5.5 also shows that not all households react the same way to fertility. Only the low-high
type increases nonparticipation from 39 to 56 percent. The finding unveils that even when having
children reshapes household’s preferences, making the household to value more home production
and to reevaluate each spouse’s leisure weight, the observed data regularity that wives augments
nonparticipation when having children is substantially explained by only one household type that
given the new valuation of the flow utility’s function input react by increasing wives’ nonpartic-
ipation. However, all household types ended up allocating more time by both spouses in home
production (see bottom of Table 5.5).
Coming back to the point on explaining that employed-nonparticipant couples in average should
dedicate less time to home production than employed-unemployed couples, Table 5.5 shows that
within household of the same type, unemployed wives always allocate more time in home produc-
tion than nonparticipant wives when married a full-time husband (see bottom lines of each matrix).
However, in the aggregate, this prediction on joint labor supply and joint time allocation applies
to husbands and not to wives. This is explained because the gender differential composition of the
nonparticipant over home production types.
The fifth empirical implication refers to explaining low wage earners. In developing countries,
11The estimation found that the most frequent households in Colombia are low-low and low-high home production
productivities.
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it is quite often to observe familiar, informal workers or self-employed that earns zero or wages
close to zero. My model rationalizes that the need for more consumption by combining labor
income and home production is a force that underlies low wage earners’ behavior. In this regard,
Figure 5.3 shows that the model fits the left tail of the wage distributions among genders and work
hours.
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Figure 5.1: Observed and Simulated Labor Market Status Proportions by Gender and Children in
the Household
Note: Data are from simulations at the point estimates reported in Table 5.1 and from on 2012-2013 Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH)
and Encuesta Nacional del Uso del Tiempo (ENUT). Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed
full-time.
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Table 5.1: Method of Simulated Moments Estimation Results: Parameter Estimates
Value
Parameter Description Male Female
λA job offers to unemployed 0.49 0.41
(0.0001) (0.0000)
γA job offers to employed 0.03 0.03
(0.0001) (0.0000)
ηPA termination shock to part-time employed 0.03 0.02
(0.0000) (0.0000)
ηFA termination shock to full-time employed 0.03 0.03
(0.0000) (0.0000)
µPA lognormal part-time wage offer location parameter 3.9 2.3
(0.0686) (0.0000)
µFA lognormal full-time wage offer location parameter 2.6 2.1
(0.0004) (0.0000)
σPA lognormal part-time wage offer scale parameter 8.6 6.4
(0.5737) (0.0103)
σFA lognormal full-time wage offer scale parameter 3.5 3.5
(0.0031) (0.0108)
p probability of part-time job offer 0.05 0.36
(0.0008) (0.0007)
sA search cost 2.66 2.43
(0.0003) (0.0002)
αKA weight of leisure with children 0.19 0.18
(0.0000) (0.0000)
PKZ price of home production with children 0.27
(0.0000)
αNKA weight of leisure without children 0.17 0.19
(0.0015) (0.0000)
PNKZ price of home production without children 0.17
(0.0055)
δ CRRA consumption parameter 0.21
(0.0000)
βA CRRA leisures parameters 0.06 0.24
(0.0000) (0.0000)
ΠA probability of low type in home production 0.92 0.52
(0.0001) (0.0002)
πH home productivity of the high type 2.07
(0.0001)
θ home production CES substitution parameter 0.69
(0.0001)
ω consumption CES substitution parameter 0.34
(0.0001)
τK arrival rate of children 0.04
(0.0001)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are computed by boostrap with 40 replications. Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P=
employed part-time; F= employed full-time; A={husbands, wives}.
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Table 5.2: Estimation Results: Mean and Variance of Wage Offer Distribution (thousands of pesos)
and Implied Months for Arrival Shocks
Male Female
mean of P wages 3.9 2.3
variance of P wages 8.6 6.4
mean of F wages 2.6 2.1
variance of F wages 3.5 3.5
job offers to unemployed (months) 2.0 2.4
job offers to employed (months) 33.5 37.4
laid-off shock to part-time employed (months) 39.3 40.8
laid-off shock to full-time employed (months) 38.5 34.9
arrival of children (years) 2.0
aging of children (years) 12.5
Note: Data are from simulations at the point estimates reported in Table 5.1 and from on 2012-2013 Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH)
and Encuesta Nacional del Uso del Tiempo (ENUT). Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed
full-time; EMP= Past Employment.
Figure 5.2: Observed and Simulated Mean Time in Home Production by Labor Market State (per-
cent)
Note: Data are from simulations at the point estimates reported in Table 5.1 and from on 2012-2013 Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH)
and Encuesta Nacional del Uso del Tiempo (ENUT). Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed
full-time.
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics: Observed and Simulated Labor Market Components
Labor Market Status:
Husbands Wives
Sample Simulated Sample Simulated
No Children Children No Children Children No Children Children No Children Children
N 1.9 3.8 0.6 0.1 N 41.5 33.7 40.0 31.8
U 3.8 5.0 5.0 5.5 U 4.2 6.4 3.9 3.6
P 5.0 6.7 4.9 4.9 P 21.6 19.5 20.7 22.6
F 89.2 84.6 89.5 89.4 F 32.7 41.8 35.4 39.7
Labor marker assortative mating:
Sample Simulated
Wives’ Labor Mkt: Wives’ Labor Mkt:
Husband’s N U P F Husband’s N U P F
Lab. Mkt: Lab. Mkt:
N 0.9 0.1 0.4 0.8 N - - - 0.6
U 1.3 0.3 0.8 1.6 U 1.2 0.7 1.2 1.9
P 2.0 0.2 1.4 1.6 P 1.4 0.2 1.2 2.0
F 36.2 3.7 18.6 30.0 F 36.4 3.2 18.9 31.2
Labor market transitions from a year to the present:
Husbands:
Sample Simulated
From\To N U P F From\To N U P F
N 1.2 - - - N 0.4 - - -
U 0.1 0.1 1.1 15.8 U 0.0 0.1 0.8 13.3
P - - 2.5 - P - - 2.8 -
F - - - 44.9 F - - - 51.5
EMP 0.8 3.9 1.6 27.9 EMP 0.2 4.9 1.3 24.8
Wives:
Sample Simulated
From\To N U P F From\To N U P F
N 31.9 - - - N 29.9 - - -
U 1.3 0.4 7.7 11.0 U 1.0 1.7 4.8 8.1
P - - 9.7 - P - - 12.1 -
F - - - 14.6 F - - - 19.7
EMP 7.3 3.9 3.9 8.3 EMP 8.0 2.3 4.4 7.9
Mean wages (thousands of pesos):
Sample Simulated
Overall By Spouse Labor Market State Overall By Spouse Labor Market State
N U P F N U P F
P Husbands 4.4 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.5 6.6 3.0 3.6 3.7
F Husbands 3.4 3.5 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.3 4.4 1.8 2.7 2.6
P Wives 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.9 0.0 2.6 2.8 2.9
F Wives 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.7 2.7 7.7 2.5 2.6 2.6
Std. dev. Wages (thousands of pesos):
Sample Simulated
Overall By Spouse Labor Market State Overall By Spouse Labor Market State
N U P F N U P F
P Husbands 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.4 1.1 1.9 1.9
F Husbands 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 0.6 1.6 1.6
P Wives 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.2 . 2.1 2.2 2.2
F Wives 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.9 0.6 1.8 1.8 1.7
Note: Data are from simulations at the point estimates reported in Table 5.1 and from on 2012-2013 Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH)
and Encuesta Nacional del Uso del Tiempo (ENUT). Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed
full-time; EMP= Past Employment. From the self-reported changes in the labor market, I built males’ and females’ transitions. All the matrices in
of the labor market assortative mating and labor transitions sum up to 100. In the survey, the tenure time of the current job is reported and if the
change from a different job or no-employment. Consequently, only changes from previous employment can be identified (no part-time or
full-time), and as the model assumes that the current worker coming from no-employment, found the job from unemployment, we only have
transitions from unemployment to work.
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Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics: Observed and Simulated Time Use Components
Mean of the percentage of time dedicated to home production:
Husbands Wives
Sample Simulated Sample Simulated
No Children Children No Children Children No Children Children No Children Children
N 21.5 20.8 31.5 32.3 N 30.2 39.5 28.4 43.0
U 27.6 22.6 19.2 25.3 U 29.9 39.4 28.8 38.9
P 12.7 15.7 11.0 15.6 P 21.4 30.8 18.4 28.2
F 7.4 9.3 6.8 8.9 F 12.7 19.3 13.2 19.3
Std. Dev. of the percentage of time dedicated to home production:
Husbands Wives
Sample Simulated Sample Simulated
No Children Children No Children Children No Children Children No Children Children
N 17.9 16.0 2.8 7.1 N 11.2 15.7 7.6 8.7
U 16.9 15.0 6.3 8.1 U 10.9 15.5 8.4 9.1
P 7.1 12.3 5.3 6.3 P 9.2 14.1 6.4 7.3
F 6.6 8.6 3.7 4.6 F 6.8 11.3 5.1 6.0
Mean of the percentage of time devoted to home production by:
Husbands
Sample Simulated
Husband’s wives’ labor state: wives’ labor state:
Lab. St.: N U P F N U P F
N N
U 24.6 24.0 U 16.3 27.1
P 13.6 15.3 17.3 P 11.8 15.9 16.5
F 8.5 11.6 9.7 9.4 F 6.6 8.6 9.5 10.5
Wives
Sample Simulated
Husband’s wives’ labor state: wives’ labor state:
Lab. St.: N U P F N U P F
N N
U 32.5 17.9 U 52.0 16.3
P 36.0 30.2 17.5 P 40.6 25.1 18.0
F 39.0 37.4 29.8 18.4 F 41.0 38.3 26.9 18.7
Note: Data are from simulations at the point estimates reported in Table 5.1 and from on 2012-2013 Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH)
and Encuesta Nacional del Uso del Tiempo (ENUT). Home production time allocation is only reported for joint labor market status with
frequencies higher than 1%. Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed full-time; EMP= Past
Employment.
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Figure 5.3: Observed, Simulated, and Implicit Wage Offer Distribution by Spouse and Work Hours
Note: Data are from simulations at the point estimates reported in Table 5.1 and from on 2012-2013 Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH)
and Encuesta Nacional del Uso del Tiempo (ENUT). Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed
full-time.
50
Figure 5.4: Sequential Spouses’ Labor Supply Decisions: Husband Receives a Full-Time Offer
First
Note: This graph represents the maximization of spouses’ labor decisions for a household with children with low home productivity for both
spouses. The first panel on the left presents a case in which both spouses are nonworkers. The panel in the middle considers the event when the
husband is receiving a full-time job offer. Once the husband has accepted a full-time job offer and the wife has decided to remain unemployed, the
third panel considers the event in which the wife receives a full-time job offer. The maximum wage considered in the current exercise is 8 thousand
pesos. Simulations based on parameter estimates (see Table 5.1). Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F=
employed full-time; EMP= Past Employment.
Figure 5.5: Sequential Spouses’ Labor Supply Decisions: Wife Receives a Full-Time Offer First
Note: This graph represents the maximization of spouses’ labor decisions for a household with children with low home productivity for both
spouses. The first panel on the left presents a case in which both spouses are nonworkers. The panel in the middle considers the event when the
wife is receiving a full-time job offer. Once the wife has accepted a full-time job offer and the husband has decided to remain unemployed, the third
panel considers the event in which the husband receives a full-time job offer. The maximum wage considered in the current exercise is 8 thousand
pesos. Simulations based on parameter estimates (see Table 5.1). Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F=








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.5: Household Type, Labor Status, and Mean Time in Home Production
Labor Market Status:
Husbands Wives
HH Type: Total low-low low-high high-low high-high Total low-low low-high high-low high-high
No Children:
N 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.9 31.8 25.0 38.9 20.5 41.3
U 5.5 5.8 5.8 1.3 3.8 5.9 5.9 6.0 5.1 5.8
P 4.9 4.4 5.7 5.1 2.9 22.6 26.8 18.0 29.5 18.3
F 89.4 89.8 88.6 92.3 91.3 39.7 42.2 37.1 44.9 34.6
Children:
N 0.6 0.9 0.0 4.1 1.0 40.0 27.4 55.8 22.1 42.1
U 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.3 4.2 3.9 5.0 2.7 5.0 2.6
P 4.9 5.1 4.6 4.6 5.8 20.7 24.6 15.7 25.0 22.4
F 89.5 89.0 90.4 85.9 89.0 35.4 43.1 25.8 47.9 32.9
Mean of the percentage of time dedicated to home production:
Husbands Wives
HH Type: Total low-low low-high high-low high-high Total low-low low-high high-low high-high
No Children:
N 31.5 0.0 0.0 34.8 29.9 28.4 19.8 34.8 10.8 29.2
U 19.2 23.8 13.0 40.0 32.3 28.8 21.4 37.6 12.1 30.0
P 11.0 14.4 6.6 26.6 20.1 18.4 14.2 26.4 6.8 21.0
F 6.8 8.5 3.3 17.9 12.4 13.2 9.1 18.9 3.9 14.0
Children:
N 32.3 27.3 0.0 43.0 36.7 43.0 32.4 49.6 21.0 43.6
U 25.3 29.5 17.2 45.9 39.2 38.9 34.1 51.7 21.5 44.8
P 15.6 18.6 9.1 31.8 25.0 28.2 23.7 37.6 14.0 32.1
F 8.9 11.1 4.6 21.9 15.8 19.3 15.9 27.4 8.4 22.0
Note: Table reports steady state statistics by household type and the total simulated sample. Top panel reports steady state labor market status
proportions. Bottom panel reports steady state mean of the percentage of time dedicated to home production by labor market state. Simulations
based on parameter estimates (see Table 5.1). Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed full-time;
EMP= Past Employment; hus= husbands; wif= wives; low= low home production productivity; high= high home production productivity.
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Figure 5.8: Model’s Relationship Between Wages and Home Production
Note: Simulations based on parameter estimates (see Table 5.1. Abbreviations: hp= time share in home production; 1=husband; 2=wife; N=




6.1 Gender Gap Decomposition
I perform a set of counterfactual experiments to understand the optimization process that house-
holds are implementing. My gender gap decomposition does not include firm’s behavior (see
Bowlus (1997), Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), and Flabbi (2010)), but it contributes by including
home production time allocation by both spouses. I focus on gender gap decompositions that
equalize females’ parameters to males’ values, and then I supplement my analysis performing an
additional informative experiment. Table 6.1 presents the definitions for the gender gap decomposi-
tion. The first experiment equates all the parameters between genders. The second equalizes wives’
parameters to husbands’ that represent labor market frictions in the model (λA, γA, ηPTA , η
FT
A , sA),
and the third does the same with the parameters associated with the wage offers (µhA , σ
h
A, p). The
fourth equates the proportion of part-time offers (p), while the fifth and the sixth equate respectively
the low type proportions between wives and husbands (ΠW → ΠM ) and the wives’ instantaneous






W , β1, β2). The seventh exercise, which is pre-
sented in addition to the gender gap decomposition, fixes the husbands’ low type proportions to
the wives’ values (ΠM → ΠW ).
Even when the experiments are not considering the firm’s side, there is a set of policies that
I can relate to the counterfactual experiments proposed. Policies that could close the gender gap
in the structural labor parameters are anti-discrimination measures that give employers’ economic
incentives to employ females. These policies are implemented in the form of, for instance, quota
requirements (this one could explicitly represent the second experiment), laws against labor dis-
crimination, and laws against any type of violence. Oelz et al. (2013) provide two examples: In
Germany and the UK some laws required large enterprises to disclose the earnings of the employ-
ees to promote transparency and close wage gender gaps (third experiment).
Policies that equate preference parameters between genders could be a combination of women’s
self-help measures and promotional campaigns that highlight the success stories of Colombian
women. These can shift social norms and gender taste for leisure and home production. For
example, a qualitative study carried out in Serbia by the World Bank (2019) highlights the need for
integrating Roma women into self-help groups composed of women from diverse communities, but
also from similar socioeconomic groups. These programs help them build social capital through a
new network, develop new capabilities that have a long-term impact on voice, and increase their
bargaining power within households that could change conventions of gender.1 In other words,
these policies can close the gaps between women and men on leisure weights and home production
productivities (the fifth, sixth, and seventh experiments).
For the presentation on the effects of policies, Figure 6.1 presents the changes in labor market
proportions between the experiments and the benchmark while Figure 6.2 illustrates the changes
in time devoted to home production and table 6.4 shows the changes in mean wages.
As expected, when the structural parameters are the same for husbands and wives, there are
no gendered differences in wages, labor participation, or home production time. In such a world,
husbands’ nonparticipation increases and full-time proportions diminish. Wives’ time supply in
home production decreases and husbands increase it at almost all labor statuses.2 Focusing on
husbands’ participation, the experiment that provides the strongest explanation for the increase in
husbands’ labor nonparticipation is when there are no gendered differences in the wage distribution
parameters. In the remaining experiments, husbands’ labor market decisions are almost unaltered.
Focusing on wives’ participation, and relative to the benchmark levels, labor market partici-
pation decisions vary a lot among the considered experiments. The experiments that induce more
wives to participate in the labor market are those in which wage distribution parameters, labor fric-
tion parameters, and home productivity distributions are the same for both genders, respectively.
On the contrary, equating the leisure parameters induces wives to increase the nonparticipation
1Only interventions that will create multiple, repeated instances of situations where women and Roma participate
(more) equally and are acknowledged as equally competent to similar men and non-Roma counterparts at socially
valued tasks are likely to be successful.
2Only nonparticipant husbands with children reduce home production time.
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proportion.3 When the wage distribution parameters are equated, wives’ participation increases
the most, while the husbands’ decreases in a small degree. Then, by labor market composition, as
more wives are in the labor market, households are perceiving less housework time by those wives.
Husbands’ part-time salaries are also lower than in the benchmark model (Table 6.4). Relative to
the benchmark, this scenario increases wives with children’ participation to 73 percent.
The experiment that equates the proportion of low type wives to the husbands’ proportions
(making wives as a group more prone to participate in the labor market) increases wives with
children’ participation to 28 percent (then this scenario increases wives’ nonparticipation almost a
40 percent of the increase given an equalization of the wage offer distribution). At the household
level, this increase in wives’ participation is coupled with changes in the spousal home production
supply. Husbands increase it at all labor states besides nonparticipation and wives decrease it at all
labor states.
The last experiment goes beyond the gender gaps decomposition to shed light on a related
question—what would happen to gender gaps if husbands were more involved in home produc-
tion? Then, the experiment performed equates the proportion of low type husbands to the wives’
proportions. Relative to the baseline, the simulation shows that wives with children increase labor
participation to 10 percent. At the household level, again, this increase in wives’ participation goes
with increases in husbands’ home production supply at all labor states.
The last two experiments find no significant effect on the wage gender gap because, in the
model, periods of employment or unemployment have no impact on the potential wages that an
individual gets either when employed or unemployed. Although the experiments highlight the im-
portance of spousal home production decisions when optimizing household resources at different
scenarios, this effect clearly is not trivial and should be taken into account when measuring the
effectiveness of policies aiming to include wives in the labor market.
3This is because husbands are less willing to sacrifice leisure quantities for labor supply and, when having children,
their leisure weights are higher than the wives’. The experiments also show that wives with children will reduce their
labor participation even more than wives without children.
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6.2 Covid-19 Type Shock
For Colombia, evidence has shown that, due to the Covid-19 shock, women have exited the
labor market more than men, and women’s unemployment has increased more than men’s (Cuesta
and Pico (2020) and Garcia-Rojas et al. (2020)). Time usage has changed towards more women’s
high production while men have increased labor hours by comparing September to December of
2020 with the same period in 2016 (Dane (2020)).
As the pandemic itself has not finished, and the final economic effects have not yet occurred,
in this section, I perform an informative exercise to simulate a Covid-19 type shock. In light of
the model, this exercise aims to answer what would be the household responses to an environment
similar to what Covid-19 has changed on the economy. The considered shocks affect husbands
ans wives symmetrically. I introduce the slowdown of economic activity by reducing the job offer
probabilities (λ and γ) and increasing the probability of job loss (η). I introduce the implosion
of the care-economics sector and school closures that drive the need for home production by an
increase of the home production price. I introduce social distancing and restrictions over gathering
activities by a reduction of the leisure weight parameters. All parameters changes are set equal to
10 percent (see Table 6.3).
Figure 6.3 shows that, household optimization leads to dramatically increase wives’ nonpar-
ticipation, while husbands’ labor participation do not change significantly. In this regard, wives’
nonparticipation without children and with children increases by 99 percent and 86 percent, re-
spectively. Unemployment increases for both genders. Concerning home production, Figure 6.4
shows that husbands and wives should allocate more time in home production. The results con-
firm the previous empirical findings that Covid-19 has deteriorated women’s labor market, but the
recent evidence does not show that men have increased home production time.4 To understand the
size and the causes of the pandemic over the household labor choices, this exercise highlights that
even when husbands and wives face a shock in equal proportions, the optimal household behavior
can increase the size of the previous participation gender gap.
4The papers and reports mentioned do not discriminate by marital status and education level, so the samples are
not fully comparable.
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The decomposition of the proposed channels to capture a Covid-type shock shows that most
of the wives’ reduction of labor participation comes from the slowdown of economic activity but
the households’ needs for more home production also explains a significant portion of the wives’
non-participation augment.
As in the benchmark scenario, not all households react the same to fertility; there is hetero-
geneity in the household’s reaction to the Covid-19 environment. Even when all household types
augment wives’ nonparticipation, in low-high and high-high households, the share of nonpartici-
pant wives is higher than 70 percent. In most of the household types, the nonparticipation of wives
with children increases even more than wives without children. Only wives in low-high households
have similar participation rates with and without children.
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Table 6.1: Gender Gap Decomposition Definitions
# Label Meaning
Benchmark
1 = gender All female parameters have the males’ values
2 Fric Female job offers and termination shocks have the males’ values
3 WageDist Female wage distribution parameters and P proportions have the males’ values
4 P Part time availability have the males’ values
5 Home P Female home productivity distribution have the males’ values
6 Lei Female leisure flow utility parameters have the males’ values









































































































































































































































































































Table 6.2: Gender Gap Decomposition: Simulated Mean Accepted Wages (thousands of pesos)
Benchmark = gender LabMarFri WageDist P Home P Leisure Male
P Males 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
F Males 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
P Females 2.9 4.6 2.9 4.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
F Females 2.7 3.3 2.7 3.2 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7
Note: Simulations based on parameter estimates (see Table 5.1 (bench) and the gender gap decomposition defined in Table 6.1. Abbreviations: N=
nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed full-time.
Table 6.3: Covid-19 Type Shock’s Definitions
# Label Meaning
Benchmark
1 Fric Arrival rate decreases and termination rates increases in 10%
2 P z Home production price increses in 10%
3 Lei Leisure weight parameters decreases in 10%











































































































































































































































































































Table 6.4: Covid-19 Decomposition: Simulated Mean Accepted Wages (thousands of pesos)
Benchmark Fric P z Lei CoLei
P Males 4.5 4.3 4.6 4.3 4.3
F Males 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
P Females 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.7
F Females 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.5
Note: Simulations based on parameter estimates (see Table 5.1 (bench) and the Covid-19 Type Shock’s definitions in Table 6.3. Abbreviations: N=
nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed part-time; F= employed full-time.
Table 6.5: Covid-19, Household Type, Labor Status, and Mean Time in Home Production
Labor Market Status:
Husbands Wives
HH Type: Total low-low low-high high-low high-high Total low-low low-high high-low high-high
No Children:
N 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 63.2 45.1 83.4 34.6 74.0
U 7.1 7.3 7.0 6.4 7.7 3.9 5.0 2.2 9.0 4.8
P 4.4 4.3 4.5 3.8 4.8 12.8 20.2 5.1 19.2 7.7
F 88.3 87.9 88.6 89.7 87.5 20.1 29.8 9.3 37.2 13.5
Children:
N 0.5 0.5 0.1 3.9 0.2 74.7 56.3 97.3 35.3 95.2
U 6.8 6.7 7.1 5.8 7.2 1.9 3.5 0.0 5.3 0.0
P 5.0 5.7 4.3 5.7 4.8 8.7 14.8 1.2 21.8 1.0
F 87.6 87.1 88.6 84.6 87.8 14.7 25.4 1.5 37.6 3.8
Mean of the percentage of time dedicated to home production:
Husbands Wives
HH Type: Total low-low low-high high-low high-high Total low-low low-high high-low high-high
No Children:
N 29.6 29.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.8 29.0 46.6 17.9 40.0
U 27.7 32.3 19.3 48.9 41.4 34.6 30.2 48.8 18.5 42.4
P 16.1 19.8 9.9 33.3 27.2 23.1 20.8 35.0 11.7 29.3
F 9.7 12.2 5.2 23.4 17.0 15.9 13.8 25.5 7.1 19.9
Children:
N 41.9 36.7 25.4 53.0 46.9 53.7 43.7 60.9 31.6 55.0
U 33.5 38.5 25.0 55.6 47.8 44.1 45.7 0.0 32.4 0.0
P 21.9 25.2 13.7 39.4 31.8 31.8 32.1 46.0 21.6 40.0
F 12.7 15.6 7.4 27.6 20.8 21.8 22.2 33.5 13.6 28.8
Note: Table reports steady state statistics by household type and the total simulated sample. Top panel reports steady state labor market status
proportions. Bottom panel reports steady state mean of the percentage of time dedicated to home production by labor market state. Simulations
based on the Covid-19 Type Shock’s definitions in Table 6.3, 4th definition. Abbreviations: N= nonparticipant; U= unemployed; P= employed




This dissertation constructs and estimates a structural search model that introduces spousal
home production decisions to understand labor market gender gaps between couples. To the best
of my knowledge, it is the first time a search model with these features has been used to study
gender dynamics among spouses. However, many challenges to developing a full comprehension
of spousal behavior remain.
First, even with the selected sample of individuals with a low level of education, the presence
of any source of non-labor income changes the marginal utility of labor income and as a result
the labor supply decisions of individuals with different non-labor income levels will be different.
For this reason, FM include two positive levels of non-labor income and the absence of it in their
analysis. Additionally, international evidence has shown that the labor and non-labor income of
other household members is an essential factor in determining female labor participation (Hafez
and Ahmad (2002); Andres et al. (2017)). Also, besides taste for leisure and home production,
it can be argued that households with members with acute diseases are different than households
with healthy members. To this end, health status is a condition that changes the probability of
employment and tenure (Blau and Gilleskie (2001)).
Second, it is well understood in labor economics that more labor experience implies higher
wages and that long periods of unemployment or nonparticipation can reduce the expected wage
offers.1 In my model, returning participants face no labor penalty. Applied to gender gaps, Xiao
(2020) made an equilibrium model over the life cycle to assess the wage gap and its relationship
with parental leave policies. Her story is the following: because employers expect that women
1For example, Bobba, Flabbi, and Levy (2017) designed a model where employed workers accumulate human cap-
ital by layers at different rates whether they are working formally or informally. When unemployed, the accumulated
human capital can be depreciated at a given rate.
stop their careers to have children, this expectation induces them to offer lower wages to females.
Additionally, because of those anticipated career interruptions, women accumulate less labor expe-
rience, and consequently, lower wages. But, even for countries that allow for spouses’ negotiation
over the parental leave time that each spouse takes, wives take more parental leave time. When sim-
ulating changes in parental leave policies, Xiao (2020) took the data share of the parental leave that
wives exhibited, making exogenous this household decision. The framework I develop can gen-
erate this decision endogenously, making spouses decide the share of the total parental leave that
each spouse takes while optimizing on spousal work, leisure, and home production time. Thus,
future research can incorporate the human capital, parental leave, and time allocation decisions
within a single model.
Third, as mentioned in my model’s theoretical explanation, home production has market substi-
tutes, and households can do housework themselves or hire some goods and services in the market
to have more time to work or to enjoy leisure. Future work can expand in this direction to in-
corporate the effect of market substitute availability. In this regard, the static setting presented by
Berlinski et al. (2020) presents an endogenized decision for child care places to emerge and fill the
households’ necessity to contract them, replacing home production time with labor supply. Addi-
tionally, Turon (2019) modeled an environment with home production with a market price for the
substitutes. Her model constrains the time allocation over the eight daily working hours. However,
the gender gaps go beyond the definition of eight work hours; when summing hours worked in the
market and at home, women tend to do more work and enjoy less leisure, my model can speak to
those differences as it is defined over 24 hours.
Finally, the current model is a partial equilibrium. Hanming and Shepard (2019) developed a
general equilibrium search model, but replicating this extension would rely on future data avail-
ability. Hamming and Shepard also included labor supply, demand information, and employer-
provided health insurance. In the present exercise, I did not have firms’ information and the esti-
mated labor market parameters did not allow for the determination of whether the labor parameters





In this dissertation, I develop and estimate a household search model of the labor market that
considers the home production allocation for both spouses. The model structure is defined to cap-
ture several possible combinations of spouses’ labor supply and home production time allocations.
Colombia is an interesting case of study as households exhibit a positive or non-decreasing rela-
tionship between one spouse’s labor supply and the other spouse’s home production. The proposed
model has the flexibility to capture this data trend by a definition of the consumption function that
imperfectly combines market consumption and home production. Additionally, I find that some
degree of substitution between spouses’ home production is needed in the home production tech-
nology for couples to exert labor supply. This last finding proves the importance of introducing the
spouses’ home production decisions to analyze joint labor market decisions.
I show that it is possible to estimate imperfect substitution parameters between market con-
sumption and home production between spouses’ time allocation in home production and the gen-
der distribution over home production productivity types, using standard functional forms and
exploiting the different mean and standard deviation of the spouses’ allocations to home produc-
tion at any joint labor market state and genders’ differentials in labor supply. With this defined
structure, the model seeks to explain the genders’ asymmetric contribution to home production on
the labor market gaps. Simulated method of moments estimates derived from household and time
usage surveys in Colombia find that wives’ home production distribution has more members be-
longing to high home productive types (which make wives as a group less willing to participate in
the labor market), that households are less willing to reduce husbands’ leisure across labor states,
and that there are gender asymmetries in labor market opportunities in favor of husbands. With the
parameter estimates, the model fits well the labor market and time usage trends.
The gender gap decomposition shows that differences in home production between spouses
account for a substantial share of the gender participation gap and that differences in the labor
market can explain the largest share of the gender participation gap. Also, the wage gender gap
results from the gender differences in the parameters of the wage offer distribution. I also perform
a informative counterfactual experiment to simulate the Covid-19 shock, and the model finds that
a Covid-19 shock will dramatically reduce wives’ labor participation.
The model’s definition of the heterogeneous spousal types in terms of each spouse labor pro-
ductivity (low or high) predicts different wage level of the employed spouse that sends the non-
working spouse to nonparticipation. Additionally, the model finds that the observed increase in
wives’ nonparticipation when having children is mainly driven by households where the wives are
more productive in home production than husbands. The other household types do not change
wives’ nonparticipation when having children. Under a Covid-19 type shock, the wives’ nonpar-
ticipation responses also varies by household type.
All these results highlight the future potential to continue exploiting the time usage information
to understand the differential responses that different households would exhibit under changes in
the economic or social circumstances.
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